## SFC2021 Programme for AMIF, ISF and BMVI

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1. Programme strategy: main challenges and policy responses Reference: points (a)(iii), (iv), (v) and (ix) Article 22(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 (CPR)

The Belgian law enforcement structure is composed of a great number of actors, partners and target groups, which all have a role to play in the prevention of and fight against crime, risks and crisis. Each of these has its own capabilities, responsibilities, and dedicated budget. Within this **institutional complexity**, the following main partners can be identified:

- a) The Belgian Integrated Police, which is structured on two levels, the Federal Police on the one hand and the 185 local police zones on the other hand. Although both levels are autonomous, they cooperate to perform an integrated police function. The Belgian Federal Police consists of 12.103 staff members (operational and civil servants) and has an annual budget of € 876.475.000 (without taking into account the budget for integrated functioning). The Federal Police carries out missions within its sphere of activity throughout the whole territory of Belgium. As such, it carries out specialized and supra-local tasks of judicial and administrative police. It is also in charge of providing a wide range of operational and other support for the local police forces. Finally, the Federal Police represents all the Belgian police services within the framework of international police cooperation. The local police zones are responsible for executing the basic police functions, both in terms of judicial police and administrative police, within the territory of their zone. The basic police functions are community policing, responsiveness, intervention, victim support, local criminal investigation, traffic and maintaining public order. In 2018, 35.404 people worked for the local police (both operational and civil servants).
- **b)** The **Ministry of Interior Affairs** (with approximately 5.670 FTE's and an annual budget of € 84.838.821), of which the following actors play an important role in the ISF-context:
  - The General Directorate Security and Prevention (with approximately 200 FTE's and an annual working budget of € 2.138.000), which is responsible for translating the national security policy to local authorities and supports the municipalities and local police zones in the development of the local security policy. It is also in charge of developing, evaluating and monitoring the security policy regulation regarding various security actors (public and private).
  - The **National Crisis Centre** (with approximately 164 FTE's and an annual working budget of € 5.238.250), which ensures a 24/7 monitoring and identifies every security and safety-related incident on the Belgium territory. In case of a major incident, it will coordinate the response at the federal level. It is responsible for the alerting of the population in case of emergencies and hosts a nationwide platform on which all stakeholders in crisis management are connected. It is also the home of the newly established Belgian Passenger Information Unit (BelPIU), responsible for the collection, storage and processing of international passenger's data (Belgian PNR system).
  - The Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) (with approximately 35 FTE's and an annual working budget of  $\in$  727.000), which makes punctual or strategic assessments of the terrorist and extremist threats in and against Belgium.
  - The Staff Directorate ICT (with approximately 86 FTE's and an annual budget of  $\in$  3.044.000), which is involved in several ICT-projects aimed at a better (international) information-exchange.
  - The **Federal services of the governors** (with approximately 335 FTE's and an annual budget of € 1.787.000), which are charged with, amongst others, civil security and emergency planning. In addition, the governor of the province of West-Flanders functions as the so-called 'administrative authority at sea'. It is responsible for the coordination of the Belgian North Sea Emergency & Contingency Plan and acts as competent authority for ships in need of assistance.
- c) The Ministry of Justice (with approximately 20.693 FTE's and an annual budget of  $\in$  1.948.320.582), of which the following actors play an important role in the ISF-context:
  - The **Directorate-General for Penitentiary Institutions (DG EPI)**, which is responsible for the execution of penalties and measures against deprivation of liberty.
  - The National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology (NICC), which conducts independent investigations at request of the judicial authorities as the scientific branch of the Ministry of Justice.

In the context of the Internal Security Fund, the following phenomena – amongst other - were considered as **priorities** in the **Integral Security Framework Document** and **BE's National Security Plan** 2016-2019: (1) radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism; (2) smuggling of human beings and facilitating of illegal migration; (3) an updated integral and integrated drug policy; (4) social and tax fraud; and (5) cybercrime and cybersecurity. Both the 'Integral Security Framework Document' (*i.e.* 'Kadernota Integrale Veiligheid') and the National Security Plan constitute the strategic guidance documents on the basis of which BE's security policy and its priorities eventually takes shape. A new 'Integral Security Framework Document' and a new 'National Security Plan' for the upcoming period have – at this stage – not yet been validated. The validity of the National Security Plan 2016-2019 has however been extended until the end of 2021. In her recent Policy Declaration, BE's Minister of Interior confirmed that a new National Security Plan would be applicable from 01/01/2022 onwards.

The above-mentioned priorities are in line with the priorities laid down in the most recent **EMPACT Cycle for the period 2022-2025**, where BE will be driving the priorities (OAP's) on 'High-Risk Criminal Networks' (HRCN) and 'Child Sexual Exploitation' (CSE), and will be co-driving Excise. Hence, BE will continue its focus and contribute to the (renewed) EMPACT cycle.

In terms of **challenges**, over the past few years, Belgium's (BE) law enforcement agencies (LEA's) were confronted with various serious and organized crime phenomena as well as with a huge spike in radicalization and terrorism cases, resulting in tremendous pressure on BE's security services. In addition, it can be observed that **most crime types** have an **international character** and therefore transcend national borders.

Besides this internationalization of crime, it became evident that both the internet – in particular the dark web – and technology are one of the most important drivers for today's security problems and are nowadays often used to commit crimes. This also leads to an increased complexity of crimes committed. This digital transformation of society also requires prevention and security services to permanently adapt themselves and their operating techniques to the new digital world, for example via the increased use of artificial intelligence and/or data science, the collection of electronic evidence in the vast majority of investigations, etc.

BE has the ambition to tackle these challenges by guaranteeing a multi-agency approach. In order to achieve an effective and integrated approach to problems, different authorities must work together, each from their own competences. This requires good communication, the creation of synergies and an optimal exchange of information and cooperation between the various actors and authorities in **Belgium**. In addition, BE is convinced that an essential part of an integral approach to organized crime is the 'administrative approach', whereby cities and municipalities are trying to prevent – within the context of their own functioning and competences – that criminals are being facilitated by the government. Through issuing permits, having screening processes in place and by responding quickly to signals indicating that something might be wrong, cities and municipalities can prevent a blending between legal and illegal circuits. BE also aims to maximize international cooperation at different levels. In order to address the international character of modern crime, optimal cooperation and information-exchange (both judicial and administrative) between different EU Member States is crucial. In recent years, the number of international messages that have been exchanged has dramatically increased. For instance, in 2017 the Belgian Federal Police exchanged 234.412 registered operational messages with other LEA's across the globe (an increase with 9,87 % compared to the previous year). In 2018, this number slightly dropped to 215.819 registered operational messages exchanged, while in 2019 an increase to 218.856 exchanged messages was noted.

Another challenge identified by BE consists in guaranteeing a **multidisciplinary**, **interregional and international approach in addressing emerging crisis situations**, for example linked to terrorism and other major security issues. In this regard, BE's federal government is responsible to ensure a modern and state of the art crisis infrastructure, in order to manage an emerging crisis situation as efficient as possible within BE's multi stakeholder context.

In the **previous programming period** and with the financial support of the Internal Security Fund (ISF), BE implemented several projects in line with the above-mentioned priorities. While some projects focused on specific phenomena, such as radicalization and terrorism (e.g. BIN II, PNR, Mobile Team, Family Support, PORG) or cybercrime and cybersecurity (e.g. Cybersearch), others focused on safety and security (e.g. Coastguard Centre Study, Protecting Brussels Critical Infrastructure) or tackled transversal themes (e.g. Arrondissementele Informatie- en Expertisecentra (ARIECS), Accreditation Labo's).

In terms of **lessons learned** from the implementation of the previous programming period, BE aims to increase the administrative capacity of its Responsible Authority on the one hand (by recruiting more personnel) and make intelligent use of 'simplified cost options' (SCO's) on the other hand. The projects containing a significant number of (very) small costs, as well as the –with the Audit Authority – agreed strategy to control all projects at 100%, resulted in a very heavy workload for the RA during the previous programming period, thus significantly limiting the RA's possibilities to streamline and administrative procedures.

In general, **BE** intends to continue and, where possible, enhance the actions developed under preceding funding programmes. Under Specific Objective 1, where BE plans to situate the bulk of the actions (and resources) under this National Program, a lot of attention will be devoted to the further development, implementation and/or maintenance of different existing information exchange systems and networks. BE believes that the continued well-functioning of these systems is crucial. As was the case during the previous programming period, the continued implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data, will require significant efforts. The implementation of legal obligations flowing from existing and still to be adopted EU acquis, such as, where applicable, the Directive (EU) 2016/1148 on Security of Network and Information (NIS Directive), the revision of the Prüm framework, the revised API Directive (still to be adopted), the possible revision of the PNR Directive (still to be adopted), and potentially many more, will also have a significant operational impact and require specific attention through possible actions under BE's ISF NP. Under this Specific Objective, BE also plans to make extensive use of 'operating support'.

Under **Specific Objective 2**, BE will devote resources in order to promote, increase and improve coordination and (operational) cooperation between different EU MS and specialized EU agencies, and thus streamline various initiatives. BE also has the ambition to stimulate a cross-border culture among law enforcement officers (LEO's), including through increased training.

Under **Specific Objective 3**, BE aims to (continuously) improve the technical capabilities as well as the skills and knowledge of its law enforcement officers (LEO's) to detect and combat crime, both in the physical world as well as in the digital world. As an important priority under SO3, BE strives towards an improved and state-of-the-art (technical & scientific) forensic & cyber investigation capabilities for Belgian LEAs. This will require the pooling of resources in order to exploit synergies to a maximum extent. On the detention side, improving the knowledge & skills of staff, both with regard to radicalization processes and the prevention and combatting of drug trafficking, will continue to be an important priority for BE. Potential crime prevention measures in detention might also be implemented. In terms of cybersecurity, actions focusing on improving the resilience of certain critical cyber infrastructure / architecture will play an important role.

In terms of state of play of **Schengen evaluation recommendations**, the most recent Schengen evaluations with regard to 'Police cooperation' and the functioning of the SIS / SIRENE systems - initially scheduled for 2020 - were postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In June 2021, a Schengen evaluation in the field of the Schengen Information System (SIS) was carried out in respect of Belgium. Following the evaluation, a report covering the findings and assessments, listing best practices and deficiencies identified during the evaluation was adopted by Commission Implementing Decision C(2022) 900. A Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation on addressing the deficiencies identified in the 2021 evaluation of Belgium, was adopted by the Council at its meeting held on 12 April 2022. It was highlighted that priority should be given to implementing the recommendations number 8, 9,

10, 13 and 14, notably to enhance the application used by the police for border control checks and police checks to ensure that: 1) queries on persons with multiple first names retrieve the corresponding SIS alerts; 2) the result from queries on alerts with first and last name with more than 30 characters in total, display the full names; and 3) queries on alerts containing a hyphen retrieve the corresponding SIS alert (recommendation no. 8); to correctly implement the new transliteration rules in all SIS-search applications not directly querying the Central System (C.SIS) (recommendation no. 9); to improve the availability of the N.SIS and of the full chain of national applications used for SIS queries, in particular at the Border Crossing Points (recommendation no. 10); to ensure that the Vehicle Registration Service has access to data on vehicle registration documents and vehicle registration numbers in the Schengen Information System (recommendation no. 13); and to ensure that the unique user identification number of the person performing SIS search is recorded (recommendation no. 14). Given the fact that there were a number of 'non-compliants', BE anticipates to draw up a 1st action plan by July 12th, 2022.

In terms of 'Police cooperation', a Schengen evaluation was also carried out in respect of Belgium in June 2021. At the time of writing, a Commission Implementing Decision is currently in the process of being adopted, after which a Council Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation can be adopted. However, based on available feedback, there were no aspects for which BE was deemed to be 'non-compliant'.

As things currently stand, there are no outstanding Schengen evaluation recommendations with financial implications under the scope of ISF or its predecessor instrument (ISF-Police). Given the limited size of the Belgian ISF allocation and the multitude of other policy priorities, **BE does at the moment not envisage any concrete actions under the ISF to address any future Schengen evaluation recommendations.** 

When selecting concrete actions for funding, BE will take into account the above-mentioned needs and identify the areas where funding channeled through the ISF will result in significant added-value, in line with the strategic priorities mentioned earlier. One of the priorities for (project selection under) the programme is to ensure coherence with the application of the Union acquis and, where appropriate, action plans, and this throughout the life cycle of the programme. In this regard, it is also important to mention the potential role of the Thematic Facility. Hence, BE confirms herewith that the 'types of intervention' matching the "0 EUR" amount in table 3 of the programme correspond to those for which possible future needs linked to the implementation of the Thematic Facility are anticipated, in line with Article 22(4)(d) CPR.

Lastly, the **complementarity and synergies between the ISF and other forms of support** is mainly managed at the level of the final beneficiaries. For training purposes, this includes the need to ensure coordination with CEPOL, where possible through use of and/or building on existing CEPOL materials, with a view to maximize synergies and avoid duplications. For example, the Federal Police disposes of a dedicated project unit that works with a.o. the ISF and Horizon Europe. In addition, an overall picture is centralized within the Belgian Permanent Representation who have a view on all the projects submitted in the various programmes. There is permanent communication between the Managing Authority and the Permanent Representation in order to allow for the detection of possible synergies and complementarities.

## 2. Specific Objectives & Technical Assistance

Reference: Article 22(2) and (4) CPR

Selected Selected	Specific objective or Technical assistance	Type of action
	1. Exchange of information	Regular actions
	1. Exchange of information	Specific actions
	1. Exchange of information	Annex IV actions
	1. Exchange of information	Operating support
	1. Exchange of information	Emergency assistance
	2. Cross-border cooperation	Regular actions
	2. Cross-border cooperation	Specific actions
	2. Cross-border cooperation	Annex IV actions
	2. Cross-border cooperation	Operating support
	2. Cross-border cooperation	Emergency assistance
	3. Preventing and combating crime	Regular actions
	3. Preventing and combating crime	Specific actions
	3. Preventing and combating crime	Annex IV actions
	3. Preventing and combating crime	Operating support
	3. Preventing and combating crime	Emergency assistance
	TA.36(5). Technical assistance - flat rate (Art. 36(5) CPR)	
	TA.37. Technical assistance - not linked to costs (Art. 37 CPR)	

#### 2.1.1. Description of the specific objective

#### A. Baseline situation

BE considers **information exchange** – both national & international – as key to tackling criminal activities, certainly in a VUCA-environment. Smooth and efficient information management is and will be crucial in tackling crime and ensuring public safety. **Intelligence led policing is therefore one of the pillars on which Belgian policing is based.** In this regard, the creation, strengthening and maintenance of effective systems for the exchange of information between relevant national actors, neighbouring countries, other Member States, EU agencies and international organisations has long been a priority for BE.

In the previous programming period and with the financial support of the Internal Security Fund (ISF), BE implemented several projects in this field:

- Following recommendations resulting from BE's 2015 Schengen evaluation, and more specifically
  to respond to the criticism regarding the absence of a proper case management system (CMS) for
  the SIRENE bureau, the Federal Police launched a specific ISF-funded subproject aimed at
  developing and implementing a CMS for international information exchange.
- The BINII-project addressed the need for a specific communication/information system allowing the exchange of so-called 'classified information' between the decentralized terrorism units located in the 5 judicial districts (Charleroi, Gent, Brussels, Liège and Antwerp) and the central terrorism unit of the Federal Police.
- Significant financial and human resources were devoted to the development and operationalization of a Belgian Passenger Information Unit, and this in the framework of two distinct PNR projects (PNR Functional Analysis and PNR Implementation). Apart from the purchase of the necessary hard- and software, continuous developments and improvements to the frontend application took place during the lifetime of the project.
- Building on the obligations following the Prüm Convention and Council Decisions 2008/615/JHA and 2008/616/JHA, two Prüm-related projects were implemented. The 1st ISF-funded project allowed for a rapid increase in the number of EU MS with whom BE exchanged DNA data (from initially 2 MS to 10 MS). The 2nd ISF-funded project aimed at the development and implementation of an IT-system in order to be able to track and verify whether requests for DNA info by other EU MS have been adequately treated.
- Lastly, the 'Eldorados' project foresaw in the development of a new case management system for the registration and case management of victims of human trafficking and smuggling, and this in order to replace the old software which is soon to be outdated.

Outside the framework of ISF funded projects, BE has launched a radical digital transformation process in order to ensure efficient information exchange within the Belgian integrated police, called the 'I-Police' project. A multi-annual framework agreement was launched in February 2017. Within the 'I-Police' framework, a single 'record and case management system (RMS)' for the whole country will be established, for which intelligence will be key. This intelligence is to be applied on current data, on data to be generated by the new RMS and on other data that will henceforth be able to be explored (such as unstructured data from evidence, social media, etc.). In addition, BE is also in the process of launching a national ABIS-project (Automated Biometric Identification System).

#### B. Main challenges, national needs & proposed responses

As mentioned earlier in section 1, there are a number of challenges which render good communication and an optimal exchange of information and cooperation between the various actors and authorities in and

outside Belgium even more crucial. Apart from the above-mentioned **increased complexity** & **international nature of crime**, as well as the challenges posed by **digitalization**, there are a number of specific information exchange related challenges which can be identified:

- The **multitude of channels for information exchange** at national and international level, making the management, the exchange and analysis of information more complex;
- Ensuring a uniform application of the Union acquis through the exchange of information on national & international level requires a **certain level of data quality** across LEA's in Europe;
- Information must be processed in time and the **need for real-time intelligence exchange** is rapidly increasing.
- The **amount of available data** is continuously **increasing**. Processing, storing, analyzing and exchanging big volumes of data will become increasingly important. This will require both legislative and technical modifications.

In light of these challenges, BE has identified a wide variety of **needs** to be addressed. BE has therefore decided to direct the majority of available ISF funding to actions under SO1, with a focus on these actions that will result in the largest possible EU added value. Investments in the **further development**, **implementation and/or maintenance of different existing information exchange systems and networks** will continue to be very important. BE believes that the continued well-functioning of these systems is crucial.

Closer operational cooperation can also contribute to better information exchange between competent authorities at national & international level, including by stripping away barriers to the effective use of data and data analytics and helping others exploit new and existing technology to prevent crime. In this regard, it will also be crucial to increase the exchange of information and cost efficiency between EU ICT stakeholders within Union law enforcement bodies and international organisations.

There is a **need for improved technical capabilities** to facilitate real-time law enforcement exchange of information (on national & international level). In addition, **more standardization** at technical level as well as **interoperable systems** could help to enhance the effective use and exchange of information among security services. **Enhancing data quality**, ensuring **uniform data processing** and developing **better data analytics capabilities** are crucial. Improved digital skills of law enforcement officers (LEO's) play an important role in this regard. As explained above, in light of the digital transformation envisaged with the 'I-Police' project, IT systems will need to be able to process information in a more standardized and interoperable way.

The implementation of **legal obligations** flowing from existing and still to be adopted **EU acquis**, such as the revised API Directive (still to be adopted), the upcoming revision of the Prüm framework, the possible revision of the PNR Directive (still to be adopted), and potentially many more, will also have a significant operational impact and require specific attention through possible actions under BE's ISF NP.

Hence, in terms of **concrete actions**, BE will primarily continue to focus on the setting up, enhancing/adapting and maintaining systems to collect, store and analyse data, as well as on the setting up, enhancing/adapting and maintaining of relevant IT-systems and/or networks to ensure the effective connection to different security-relevant Union information systems & communication networks, or to ensure national and international information exchange. In the context of the ISF NP, priority will be given to the development, integration and maintenance of a unique database for biometric data at the national level in the context of the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) project, to actions aimed at modernizing the 'National Entry Point' (NIP) structure, and to the enhanced integration of the multidisciplinary 'Coast Guard Centre'. Specifically with regard to the latter, it is important to note that the already existing Coast Guard centre is made up of 2 centres complementing each other: the Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre (MRCC) and the Maritime Security Centre Belgium (MIK). In a nutshell, its purpose is to respond to security incidents in the North Sea and to track down illegal activities. The proposed action is intended to focus on enhancing the integration of the two existing systems while making them interoperable.

BE also plans to build further on the 'EU-Action' project (*ISF Union Action in the 2014-2020 programming period*), which aimed to develop an IT-tool used to exchange tactical information between Special Investigation Units. As was the case during the previous programming period, the continued implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data, will also require significant additional efforts. Furthermore, BE will also continue to focus on the further implementation of its obligations under the Prüm Convention, as well as on the (continued) accreditation of the technical and scientific laboratories of the Federal Judicial Police, in line with the relevant EU Directives. This may also include the necessary training activities. Lastly, BE also anticipates to provide a certain amount of support for the development of IT-security plans (EU risk assessments) in the context of the multitude of security-related IT projects which are being implemented in order to comply with EU legal obligations, for example in the context of PNR, ABIS, Prüm, etc.

Finally, in order to tackle the above-mentioned challenges and in order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the ISF Regulation, BE plans to make extensive use of 'operating support'. In line with article 16 of the ISF Regulation, operating support will only be used to support the public authorities responsible for accomplishing the tasks and services which constitute a public service for the Union. Eligible actions for operating support under this Objective shall cover the maintenance and helpdesk of Union and where relevant national ICT systems and databases contributing to the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, as well as staff costs contributing to the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation. Under this SO, operating support will primarily be used for ensuring the necessary operational support of the API/PNR-system, including but not limited to maintenance of the secured IT infrastructure, integration of new carriers or service providers, data quality improvements, IT migration, future integration of a distributed secure API services and its related security risk mitigation measures, operational staff costs, etc.

In terms of **operating support under SO1**, potential beneficiaries include, among others:

- The Federal Police, responsible for the safety in society. It carries out specialized and supra-local police assignments within the national and international context and provides support to the police authorities and local police services:
- Ministry of Home Affairs IT department, responsible for IT-infrastructure management and development of IT-applications relevant to the field of home affairs;
- Ministry of Home Affairs National Crisis Centre, responsible for hosting and managing the Belgian Passenger Information Unit.

#### The **desired outcomes** / **expected results** under this SO are the following:

- Continued and up-to-date functioning and interoperability of relevant national and international security-related information exchange systems and networks, with a special focus on BE's obligations under the PNR Directive and under the Prüm Convention;
- Continuation of the accreditation process of technical and scientific laboratories of the Federal Judicial Police, in line with the relevant EU Directives;
- Progress towards an increased and improved exchange of tactical information between Special Investigation Units;
- Ensuring a high level of IT-security in the context of the implementation of the various security-related projects aimed at bringing BE's situation in line with the relevant EU acquis.

In line with Article 12(3) of the ISF Regulation, BE reserves itself the right to select **actions that would be eligible for higher co-financing**, for example when it comes to measures aimed at preventing and countering radicalization or projects aiming at improving the interoperability of IT systems and communication networks.

**BE** only intends to provide support in the form of grants referred to in Article 52 of the CPR.

#### C. Implementation measures

The following implementation measures are addressed:

a) Ensuring the uniform application of the Union acquis on security by supporting the exchange of relevant information, for example via Prüm, EU PNR and SIS II, including through the implementation of recommendations from quality control and evaluation mechanisms such as the Schengen evaluation mechanism and other quality control and evaluation mechanisms.

Example actions are:

- Development, integration and maintenance of a unique database for biometric data at the national level with high standards, thereby ensuring high quality and uniform data processing and storage;
- Integration of national & international workflows in the newly Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) project, including the technical capacity for incoming Prüm comparisons.
- (Continued) accreditation of the technical and scientific laboratories of the Federal Judicial Police, in line with the relevant EU Directives.
- Developing IT security plans (EU risk assessments), Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIA) and their annual updates, and/or feasibility studies before the uniform use of sensitive data via IT secure storage, for example in the context of PNR, ABIS, Prüm, etc.

# b) Setting up, adapting and maintaining security relevant Union IT systems and communication networks, including ensuring their interoperability, and developing appropriate tools to address identified gaps.

Example actions are:

- Setting up, enhancing/adapting and maintaining systems to collect, store and analyse data, including through guaranteeing the necessary upgrades / updates to existing systems, such as the PNR database, etc.
- Setting up, enhancing/adapting and maintaining relevant IT-systems and/or networks in order to ensure the effective connection to different security-relevant Union information systems & communication networks, as well as to address relevant future Union priorities, such as inter alia the EIXM single window approach for the collection PNR data, the newly (to be) adopted EU API Directive, the upcoming revision of the Prüm framework, the revision of the PNR Directive and related relevant national legislation, etc.
- Setting up, enhancing/adapting and maintaining relevant IT-systems and/or networks for national & international information exchange, such as inter alia between DNA-agencies exchanging data, etc.
- Actions aimed at modernizing the 'National Entry Point' (NIP) structure which functions as a 24/7 operational call centre for the Belgian Integrated Police, and this on national and international level by transforming it into an integrated information platform able to manage administrative, judicial and international information flows, including in times of crisis.
- c) Increasing the active use of Union security relevant information exchange tools, systems and databases, ensuring that these are fed with high quality data.

Currently no actions planned.

d) Supporting relevant national measures, including the interconnection of security-relevant national databases and their connection to Union databases when foreseen in relevant legal bases, if relevant to implement the specific objectives set out in Article 3(2)(a).

#### Example actions are:

- Enhanced integration of the *multidisciplinary 'Coast Guard Centre'* through focusing on the interoperability of national and international IT-systems for information exchange.
- Further developing and optimizing the existing IT-tool used to exchange tactical information between the Special Investigation Units, both on a national and international level (continuation of the EU-ACTION project launched as a Union Action under ISF Police).

Finally, the use of 'operating support' under this Specific Objective 1 (SO1) will be focused on the following activity areas:

• Operational support of the API/PNR-system, including but not limited to maintenance of the secured IT infrastructure, integration of new carriers or service providers, data quality improvements, IT migration, future integration of a distributed secure API services and its related security risk mitigation measures, operational staff costs, etc.

## 2.1. Specific objective 1. Exchange of information

### 2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: point (e) of Article 22(4) CPR

Table 1: Output indicators

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Milestone (2024)	Target (2029)
O.1.1	Number of participants in training activities	number	20	80
O.1.2	Number of expert meetings/workshops/study visits	number	0	0
O.1.3	Number of ICT systems set up/adapted/maintained	number	11	23
O.1.4	Number of equipment items purchased	number	0	0

## 2.1. Specific objective 1. Exchange of information

### 2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: point (e) of Article 22(4) CPR

Table 2: Result indicators

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Baseline	Measurement unit for baseline	Reference year(s)	Target (2029)	Measurement unit for target	Source of data	Comments
R.1.5	Number of ICT systems made interoperable in the Member States/ with security- relevant EU and decentralised information systems/with international databases	number	0	number	2021	20	number	Expert feedback from potential beneficiaries (notably NICC, BE Home Affairs ICT department, Coast Guard Centre, Federal Police).	Target = NICC: 3; Home Affairs ICT: 6; NCCN: 5; Coast Guard Centre: 3; FedPol: 3.
R.1.6	Number of administrative units that have set up new or adapted existing information exchange mechanisms/procedures/to ols/guidance for exchange of information with other Member States/EU agencies/international organisations/third countries	number	0	number	2021	0	number		No actions planned
R.1.7	Number of participants who consider the training useful for their work	number	0	share	2021	56	number	Currently there is no data available on this.	After consulting with potential beneficiaries who might conduct these training activities: 70 % usefullness rating = realistic estimate.

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Baseline	Measurement unit for baseline	Reference year(s)	Target (2029)	Measurement unit for target	Source of data	Comments
									Calculation method: 70 % of milestone / 2029 of data estimates under Output Indicator 1.1.
R.1.8	Number of participants who report three months after the training activity that they are using the skills and competences acquired during the training	number	0	share	2021	56	number	Currently there is no data available on this.	After consulting with potential beneficiaries who might conduct these training activities: 70 % usefullness rating = realistic estimate. Calculation method: 70 % of milestone / 2029 of data estimates under Output Indicator 1.1

### 2.1. Specific objective 1. Exchange of information

## 2.1.3. Indicative breakdown of the programme resources (EU) by type of intervention

Reference: Article 22(5) CPR; and Article 16(12) AMIF Regulation, Article 13(12) ISF Regulation or Article 13(18) BMVI Regulation

Table 3: Indicative breakdown

Type of intervention	Code	Indicative amount (Euro)
Type of action	001.ICT systems, interoperability, data quality (excluding equipment)	22,164,156.17
Type of action	002.Networks, centres of excellence, cooperation structures, joint actions and operations	279,666.35
Type of action	003. Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) or other joint operations	0.00
Type of action	004.Secondment or deployment of experts	0.00
Type of action	005.Training	1,996,464.04
Type of action	006.Exchange of best practices, workshops, conferences, events, awareness-raising campaigns, communication activities	0.00
Type of action	007.Studies, pilot projects, risk assessments	739,431.12
Type of action	008.Equipment	0.00
Type of action	009.Means of transport	0.00
Type of action	010.Buildings, facilities	0.00
Type of action	011.Deployment or other follow-up of research projects	0.00

#### 2.1.1. Description of the specific objective

#### A. Baseline situation

Over the past decade(s), it has become evident that international events and geopolitical problems have an increasing impact on Belgian law enforcement work – and by extension on all levels of the functioning of the Belgian security authorities, be they local, regional or federal. The above-mentioned **internationalisation of serious and organized crime makes** international (police) cooperation indispensable for a well-functioning police apparatus. The same logic applies to performant management of emerging crisis situations, and this both on a strategic policy level as in terms of international operations and actions in the field.

These developments therefore require a broader expertise and technical skills, as well as a wider international orientation or outlook of actors in the security field.

In the previous programming period and with the financial support of the Internal Security Fund (ISF), BE implemented the **ARIECS project** (ARIECS stands for 'Arrondissementele Informatie- en Expertisecentra'), which aimed to address the needs in terms of support, strategic analysis and knowledge sharing in applying the 'administrative approach' to certain criminal phenomena / certain types of criminal actors. The 3 established ARIEC take up a facilitative, supportive role and focus on information sharing and cooperation. While not explicitly having a cross-border focus, BE's increased focus on the 'administrative approach' in the fight against organized crime, resulted (in part) from the fact that it was in recent years increasingly confronted with criminal organisations and actors (for example those active in the production of synthetic drugs, cannabis production and drugs trafficking in general, as well as criminal motorcycle gangs) who came from abroad, and more specifically from the neighbouring countries, and established themselves in Belgium, where they invest (part of) their money in the legal economy.

Outside the framework of nationally funded ISF projects, several other interesting cross-border projects took place. On 17 May 2018, the RIEC Limburg (NL), along with Belgian ARIECs and the competent authorities in North Rhine-Westphalia, was instructed to set up a Euro-regional Information and Expertise Centre to offer support for the administrative fight against cross-border undermining crime, the EURIEC. Since September 2019, the EURIEC is operational and it provides case support for the entire border area between the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, in close collaboration with the Dutch RIECs, the Belgian ARIECs and the German partners.

Another project, the 'Confine-project' - 'Towards operational cooperation on local administrative financial investigations in the fight against human trafficking', was launched by the City of Genk and started on 01/01/2017 for a period of two years. It received funding under the ISF Call for proposals HOME/2015/ISFP/AG/THBX for 'Actions addressing trafficking in human beings'. It focuses on the important role of the local level in the fight against human trafficking. Indeed, local city governments are confronted with indications of human trafficking, for example in the hotel and catering industry, in massage salons, establishments for sexual activities, buildings for (window) prostitution, in handcarwashes, night-shops, betting centers, or in the public domain (= begging). Some of these establishments are subjected to an obligatory permit by local administration, as a result of which several checks are performed (compliance with building regulations, integrity of the applicant, financial situation of the business, etc.) However, the financial screening is limited and often fails to identify criminal activities which could lead to a refusal of the permit. As a result, human traffickers are able to use legal economy to facilitate and sustain their criminal activities, sometimes even supported by government subsidies. A thorough financial screening could provide clues of human trafficking, both during the screening process of the requested permit, as during the business operation. The Confine-project aimed to address this by developing a clear methodology to develop operational cooperation in administrative financial screening.

In **December 2019**, the **first ministerial conference on Belgian-Dutch cross-border crime** took place. The ministers aimed to reach agreements on fighting crime, in particular organised crime. In addition, the conference was also intended to identify and discuss the existing consultation structures between the two

countries, as well as, the information exchange between the respective police forces and judicial services.

In recent years, BE's Integrated Police also worked hard to **update** the **legal framework for cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries**. The **'Tournai II Accords'**, entered into force on October 1st, 2015, reinforced the French-Belgian cross-border cooperation in terms of police and customs. On 23 July 2018, a **new Benelux-Treaty** between the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg **on police cooperation** was signed in Brussels. The treaty streamlines police cooperation between Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the Benelux countries) and provides for new types of cross-border policing and enhanced information-sharing practices, such as (direct) access to each other's police databases and more flexible rules for cross-border pursuits. **Negotiations with Germany** on reinforced police cooperation are also on-going.

#### B. Main challenges, national needs & proposed responses

As mentioned earlier in section 1, there are a number of **challenges** associated with combating serious and organized crime with a cross border dimension. National borders don't stop criminals. Stronger still, **criminals intentionally use national borders in order to hide their activities** from investigative and other authorities. National borders prove to be a major obstacle in the fight against such undermining crime. **Every country has its own legislation and language**, for instance, and there are **differences in terms of powers and responsibilities**. The **degree of awareness of undermining crime** and, more specifically, the role of the administration in the fight against it, also plays an important role. BE is a country with a limited geographical size, but with a unique strategic position situated in the centre of Europe. This however also exacerbates the above-mentioned challenges of addressing cross-border crime and roaming criminal groups.

In light of these challenges, BE has identified a wide variety of **needs** to be addressed. Given the ever increasing significance of international police cooperation in current day-to-day police practice, BE needs to organise itself in this sense, and this not only in terms of processes and procedures, but also in terms of crime analysis, training and communication.

First and foremost, there is a **need to promote, increase and improve coordination and cooperation between different EU MS**, so that certain criminal phenomena can be tackled in a coordinated manner. Since crime transcends the national borders, various initiatives should be aligned. As indicated under SO1, the continued implementation of the PNR Directive will remain one of the most important policy priorities for BE under the ISF NP. BE has to ambition to (continue to) take up a leadership role in this regard through facilitating the establishment of an EU Passenger Information Unit Network, thereby ensuring the continued operational cooperation and fine-tuning between relevant PIU's. Building on one of the policy priorities in BE's National Security Plan, notably addressing the issue of smuggling of human beings, BE aims to provide support to initiatives which help to streamline the approaches within and between different EU MS, for example through the establishment of a network of national rapporteurs to share information, assess trends, evaluate policies and report on smuggling of human beings.

While there are currently no concrete actions foreseen to be financed with the support of the ISF, BE has also renewed its committment to play an active role in EMPACT, the EU's flagship instrument for multidisciplinary and multiagency operational cooperation to fight organised crime at an EU level. In the EMPACT cycle for the period 2022-2025, BE will be driving the priorities (OAP's) on 'High-Risk Criminal Networks' (HRCN) and 'Child Sexual Exploitation' (CSE), and will be co-driving Excise.

In addition, the above-mentioned changes and updates to the **legal framework** for cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries result in the fact that there is now a greater **need for training of police personnel** in these matters. These could take the form of both 'classic' trainings as 'e-learning tools'. Increased awareness about the potential and the use of joint investigation teams, joint patrols, joint operations, hot pursuits, discreet surveillance, etc., will also assist in indirectly stimulating their use, thereby resulting in a **cross-border culture among law enforcement officers (LEO's)**.

The **desired outcomes under this SO** are the following:

1. Improved knowledge & skills of LEO's on the specificities of cross border cooperation;

- 2. Progress towards the establishment of network of national rapporteurs to share information, assess trends, evaluate policies and report on smuggling of human beings;
- 3. Progress towards the establishment of an operational EU Passenger Information Unit Network.

BE currently does not envisage to spend a minimum of 10 % of the resources allocated under Article 10(1) of the ISF Regulation on activities under Specific Objective 2. Taking into account the limited ISF resources available and the relatively wide scope of the fund, BE prefers to avoid fragmentation and prioritize other projects. BE believes that this will not jeopardize the achievement of this specific objective, since it has already identified at least 3 concrete projects which will be implemented with the help of ISF funding under this SO during the upcoming programming period. In addition, a large part of the cross-border cooperation activities in which BE participates are and will continue to be implemented through different funding channels, including via regular national funds and on a more punctual basis via so-called 'Operational Task Forces' (OTF's) at the level of Europol, via low or high value EMPACT grants, as well as via Union actions. For example, the creation of the state-of-the-art EU Police Intervention and Response Training Centre of Excellence (EU-PIRTCE) in Etterbeek was co-financed through such an ISF Police grant. Participation by BE in EU-wide police networks such as AQUAPOL, RAILPOL, AIRPOL, also takes place within and via the above-mentioned funding frameworks.

Within ISF, BE's focuses mostly on actions under SO1 and SO3, in particular on EU flagship activities such as the development and enhancement of ICT systems and the improvement of data exchange under the Passengers Name Records Directive under SO1, and the protection of public spaces, actions preventing and countering radicalisation and actions preventing and countering migrant smuggling under SO3.

#### C. Implementation measures

The following implementation measures are addressed:

a) Increasing law enforcement operations between Member States, including, where appropriate, with other relevant actors, in particular facilitating and improving the use of joint investigation teams, joint patrols, hot pursuits, discreet surveillance and other operational cooperation mechanisms in the context of the EU Policy Cycle, with special emphasis on cross-border operations.

Example actions are:

- 1. Improving the knowledge & skills of LEO's on the specificities of cross border cooperation (incl. relevant obligation flowing from the Tournai Treaty, the Benelux Treaty, etc.), for example through developing & implementing training curricula and supporting tools (such as mobile applications, e-learning platform, etc.).
- b) Increasing coordination and cooperation of competent authorities within and between Member States and with other relevant actors, for example through networks of specialised national units, Union networks and cooperation structures, Union centres.

Example actions are:

- 1. Establishing a network of national rapporteurs to share information, assess trends, evaluate policies and report on smuggling of human beings.
- 2. Establishing an EU Passenger Information Unit Network (building on the existing PNR Informal Working Group), with the aim of ensuring a coherent and effective implementation of the EU PNR Regulation.
- c) Improving inter-agency cooperation at Union level between the Member States, and between Member States and relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies, as well as at national level among the competent authorities in each Member State.

Currently no actions planned.	

## 2.1. Specific objective 2. Cross-border cooperation

### 2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: point (e) of Article 22(4) CPR

Table 1: Output indicators

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Milestone (2024)	Target (2029)
O.2.1	Number of cross-border operations	number	0	0
O.2.1.1	Of which number of joint investigation teams	number	0	0
O.2.1.2	Of which number of EU policy cycle/EMPACT operational actions	number	0	0
O.2.2	Number of expert meetings/workshops/study visits/common exercises	number	23	50
O.2.3	Number of equipment items purchased	number	0	0
O.2.4	Number of transport means purchased for cross-border operations	number	0	0

## 2.1. Specific objective 2. Cross-border cooperation

### 2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: point (e) of Article 22(4) CPR

Table 2: Result indicators

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Baseline	Measurement unit for baseline	Reference year(s)	Target (2029)	Measurement unit for target	Source of data	Comments
R.2.5	The estimated value of assets frozen in the context of cross-border operations	amount	0	euro	2021	0	amount	Not applicable	No actions planned
R.2.6.1	Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations - cannabis	kg	0	kg	2021	0	kg	Not applicable	No actions planned
R.2.6.2	Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations - opioids, including heroin	kg	0	kg	2021	0	kg	Not applicable	No actions planned
R.2.6.3	Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations - cocaine	kg	0	kg	2021	0	kg	Not applicable	No actions planned
R.2.6.4	Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations - synthetic drugs, including amphetamine-type stimulants (including amphetamine and methamphetamine) and MDMA	kg	0	kg	2021	0	kg	Not applicable	No actions planned
R.2.6.5	Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations - new psychoactive substances	kg	0	kg	2021	0	kg	Not applicable	No actions planned

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Baseline	Measurement unit for baseline	Reference year(s)	Target (2029)	Measurement unit for target	Source of data	Comments
R.2.6.6	Quantity of illicit drugs seized in the context of cross-border operations - other illicit drugs	kg	0	kg	2021	0	kg	Not applicable	No actions planned
R.2.7.1	Quantity of weapons seized in the context of cross-border operations - Weapons of war: automatic firearms and heavy firearms (anti-tank, rocket launcher, mortar, etc.)	number	0	number	2021	0	number	Not applicable	No actions planned
R.2.7.2	Quantity of weapons seized in the context of cross-border operations - Other short firearms: revolvers and pistols (including salute and acoustic weapons)	number	0	number	2021	0	number	Not applicable	No actions planned
R.2.7.3	Quantity of weapons seized in the context of cross-border operations - Other long firearms: rifles and shotguns (including salute and acoustic weapons)	number	0	number	2021	0	number	Not applicable	No actions planned
R.2.8	Number of administrative units that have developed/adapted existing mechanisms/procedures/tools/guidance for cooperation with other Member States/EU agencies/international organisations/third countries	number	0	number	2021	1	number	Expert feedback from potential beneficiaries (NCCN).	Target: NCCN project 'Establishing an EU Passenger Information Unit Network': 1

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Baseline	Measurement unit for baseline	Reference year(s)	Target (2029)	Measurement unit for target	Source of data	Comments
R.2.9	Number of staff involved in cross-border operations	number	0	number	2021	0	number	Not applicable.	No actions planned
R.2.10	Number of Schengen Evaluation Recommendations addressed	number	0	number	2021	100	percentage		100 % of recommendation s in the area of police cooperation with financial implications falling within the scope of ISF.

### 2.1. Specific objective 2. Cross-border cooperation

## 2.1.3. Indicative breakdown of the programme resources (EU) by type of intervention

Reference: Article 22(5) CPR; and Article 16(12) AMIF Regulation, Article 13(12) ISF Regulation or Article 13(18) BMVI Regulation

Table 3: Indicative breakdown

Type of intervention	Code	Indicative amount (Euro)
Type of action	001.ICT systems, interoperability, data quality (excluding equipment)	0.00
Type of action	002.Networks, centres of excellence, cooperation structures, joint actions and operations	1,294,004.47
Type of action	003. Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) or other joint operations	0.00
Type of action	004.Secondment or deployment of experts	0.00
Type of action	005.Training	380,437.31
Type of action	006.Exchange of best practices, workshops, conferences, events, awareness-raising campaigns, communication activities	0.00
Type of action	007.Studies, pilot projects, risk assessments	0.00
Type of action	008.Equipment	0.00
Type of action	009.Means of transport	0.00
Type of action	010.Buildings, facilities	0.00
Type of action	011.Deployment or other follow-up of research projects	0.00

2.1. Specific objective: 3. Preventing and combating crime

#### 2.1.1. Description of the specific objective

#### A. Baseline situation

While traditional crime areas – such as international drug trafficking – remain a principal cause of concern for BE, the effects of globalization in both society and business have facilitated the **emergence of important new variations in criminal activity**. Hence, most types of serious and organized crime are currently characterized by an **transnational** / **international dimension**, and therefore increasingly **dynamic** in nature. This also implies an **increased complexity** of serious and organized crime, but also of radicalism for example.

BE considers the following phenomena – amongst other – as security **priorities**: **radicalization**, **violent** extremism and terrorism, trafficking in human beings and facilitating of illegal migration, an updated integral and integrated drug policy, social and tax fraud, cybercrime and cybersecurity.

In the previous programming period and with the financial support of the Internal Security Fund (ISF), BE implemented several projects in this field:

- In terms of cybercrime and cybersecurity, the project 'Cybersearch' aimed at providing the necessary internet research training and equipment for BE's Federal Police, thereby contributing to streamlining existing initiatives in this field. The project 'Cybersecurity' foresaw in the establishment of a 24/7 'Security Operation Center' (SOC) in order to address cyber incidents, as well as the installation of a SIEM tool (Security Information & Event Management) in order to protect critical IT infrastructure.
- In addition, several projects focusing on (detecting) radicalization were launched with the support of the ISF. For example, the projects 'Mobile Team' and its follow-up project 'Radix' aimed at providing the necessary support in terms of consultancy to local municipalities to assist them with the development of prevention projects or the implementation of their prevention and safety policies. The project 'Family Support' focused on the prevention of (violent) radicalization in BE through the support of families of radicalized youth. The projects 'PORG' and 'PREV EPI' focused on measures against radicalization in BE prisons, with the former focusing on training of prison staff and the latter on technical measures through the purchase of detection pillars.

Lastly, in terms of **innovation**, it is worth mentioning that BE is an active member of the European Clearing Board for Innovation, with a special interest in virtual/augmented reality. BE also participates in the Innovation Lab's Strategic Group on Foresight and in the Core Group on Darknet Monitoring Tools.

#### B. Main challenges, national needs & proposed responses

As mentioned earlier in section 1, there are a number of **challenges** associated with combating and preventing crime and terrorism. One important challenge relates to the role of the internet and more widely, of technolog(y)(ies), as a fundamental driver for today's security problems. Not only does the internet and modern technology as a whole play a facilitating role in criminal activities, it is also functions as an important trading platform and marketplace for the distribution of illicit goods, increasingly making use of the dark web. In recent years, a real digital underground industry has developed with the 'Darknet' as an important platform. Criminals are using the anonymity of the internet (through VPN, P2P technology, encryption,...) to carry-out their criminal activities. Examples are numerous: traditionally organised crime groups are increasingly starting to make use of services offered by the digital underground scene. Child sex offenders and producers of child sexual abuse content often use highly anonymous environments, such as the TOR Network. Malware is becoming increasingly sophisticated, intelligent, versatile, available, and is affecting a broader range of targets and devices, including through 'ransomware'. Also, there may be future threats related to payments via cryptocurrencies and the Internet of Things (IoT). Aside from the complexity associated with detecting criminal activities facilitated by the internet and modern technologies, there lies also a fundamental challenge in the speed with which these technologies – and thus the potential for new forms of crime –

develop. The implementation of **legal obligations** flowing from existing and still to be adopted **EU acquis in the field of cybersecurity**, such as Directive (EU) 2016/1148 on Security of Network and Information (NIS Directive), will also have a significant operational impact and require specific attention through possible actions under BE's ISF NP, albeit only in terms of enhancing the resilience of critical entities in both the cyber- and non-cyber (physical) realms.

Another important challenge lies in the **rise of 'poly-criminality'** which has been observed in recent years, whereby organized crime groups operate in several illegal trades, such as drugs, firearms and human trafficking. These developments also contribute to the increased complexity of contemporary crime, and make the need for an effective and integrated approach to different crime types even more urgent.

In light of these challenges, BE has identified a wide variety of **needs** to be addressed. Since criminals often use modern technology which continues to evolve at high speed, the **technical capabilities as well as the skills and knowledge of our law enforcement officers (LEO's) to detect and combat crime, both in the physical world as well as in the digital world, need to be (continuously) improved. Excellent forensic IT-skills, both on the police and the judicial side, will be crucial in this regard. Hence, BE aims to strive towards an improved and state-of-the-art (technical & scientific) forensic & cyber investigation capabilities for Belgian LEAs. BE therefore plans several initiatives in this field for the upcoming years. These may also include the necessary training activities, where feasible. On the <b>detention side**, improving the knowledge & skills of staff, both with regard to radicalization processes and drug use / drug related problems, will continue to be an important priority for BE. Training activities in these thematic fields could encompass both 'live' as well as 'e-learning' formats, with the latter allowing for significant cost rationalization.

Another need identified by BE concerns the **need for a closer operational cooperation** between the competent authorities, both at national & international level. Different authorities need to **cooperate more and in a more efficient way**, each from their own competences. By **pooling resources and knowledge and sharing best practices**, it should be possible to exploit synergies. Specifically when it comes to training purposes, it will be important to ensure coordination with CEPOL, where possible through use of and/or building on existing CEPOL materials, and this with a view to maximize synergies and avoid duplications. While there are currently no concrete actions foreseen to be financed with the support of the ISF, BE has renewed its committment to play an active role in EMPACT, the EU's flagship instrument for multidisciplinary and multiagency operational cooperation to fight organised crime at an EU level. In the EMPACT cycle for the period 2022-2025, BE will be driving the priorities (OAP's) on 'High-Risk Criminal Networks' (HRCN) and 'Child Sexual Exploitation' (CSE), and will be co-driving Excise.

In terms of **early identification, protection and support of crime victims**, BE plans to use qualitative data analyses and promote IT-solutions for data analysis, victim profiling and risk mapping, for example in the field of trafficking in human beings.

On the **detention side**, potential crime prevention measures might also be implemented (e.g specific certified psychodiagnostic instruments and material for a better risk management regarding specific categories of prisoners, etc.), thereby preventing crime during detention, guarantee a better security and safety during detention and post-detention, preventing recidivism and committing of new crimes in society.

In terms of **protecting critical infrastructure and addressing vulnerabilities**, BE aims to focus on improving, in line with the new EU Cybersecurity Regulation, the NIS Directive and the (draft) Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities, the necessary resilience of certain key aspects of its critical ICT architecture / infrastructure.

The **desired outcomes under this SO** are the following:

- Improved and state-of-the-art (technical & scientific) forensic & cyber investigation capabilities for Belgian LEAs;
- Increased quantity and quality of data availability in the field of trafficking of human beings;
- Improved knowledge & skills of detention staff, both with regard to radicalization processes and drug use / drug related problems;

- Better crime prevention during detention, including through the implementation of risk management measures regarding specific categories of prisoners;
- Improved resilience of certain critical ICT architecture / infrastructure, in line with the (draft) Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities.

#### C. Implementation measures

The following implementation measures are addressed:

a) Increasing training, exercises and mutual learning, specialised exchange programmes, and sharing of best practice in and between Member States' competent authorities, including at local level, and with third countries and other relevant actors.

Example actions are:

- Improving the knowledge & skills of staff working in existing and newly specialized detention units for high risk offenders (such as 'Deradex'-units, satellite prisons,...), for example through developing, updating & implementing (existing and new) training curricula and supporting tools for detecting radicalisation, as well as through multi-disciplinary screening.
- Developing and implementing inclusive forms of 'multi-disciplinary & multi-agency drugs & awareness training' for staff working in prisons, aimed at balancing all aspects of working with drug-related problems in the field (both enforcement and non-enforcement).
- Training of experts (psychologists and social assistants) in the use of specific certified psychodiagnostic material and treatment models in order to manage risks-needs-responsivity.
- b) Exploiting synergies by pooling resources and knowledge and sharing best practices among Member States and other relevant actors, including civil society through, for instance, the creation of joint centres of excellence, the development of joint risk assessments, or common operational support centres for jointly conducted operations.

Example actions are:

- Creating a 'Forensic IT department' within the National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology (NICC), focusing on (i) the operationalization of high-end scientific niches (e.g. derived from in-house or externally developed tools and methods, including adaptation, customization and operationalization of EU funded R&D project results), (ii) the development of advisory services within the Belgian judicial landscape (e.g. offering magistrate insights and advice on technical options, depth and risk analysis vs. overall cost and time effectiveness), and (iii) direct application of high-end in-house technical expertise in judicial casework.
- c) Promoting and developing measures, safeguards, mechanisms and best practices for the early identification, protection and support of witnesses, whistle-blowers and victims of crime and to develop partnerships between public authorities and other relevant actors to this effect.

Example actions are:

- Developing and conducting qualitative data analyses in cooperation with specialized organisations in order to improve the understanding of the profiles of victims of trafficking in human beings.
- d) Acquiring relevant equipment and setting up or upgrading specialised training facilities and other essential security relevant infrastructure to increase preparedness, resilience, public awareness and adequate response to security threats.

Example actions are:

• Improving chemical analytical capabilities for forensic scientists in order to be able to detect,

investigate and dismantle clandestine synthetic drug laboratories.

e) Protecting critical infrastructure against security-related incidents by detecting, assessing and closing vulnerabilities.

Example actions are:

• Developing and/or purchasing a modular technological security column which includes components to detect and identify visual and/or auditory signals. As such, the unit will provide support for perimeter security and access control. The aim is to achieve an integration of separate security systems.

## 2.1. Specific objective 3. Preventing and combating crime

### 2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: point (e) of Article 22(4) CPR

Table 1: Output indicators

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Milestone (2024)	Target (2029)
O.3.1	Number of participants in training activities	number	210	1,330
O.3.2	Number of exchange programmes/workshops/study visits	number	2	6
O.3.3	Number of equipment items purchased	number	5	7
O.3.4	Number of transport means purchased	number	0	0
O.3.5	Number of items of infrastructure/security relevant facilities/tools/mechanisms constructed/ purchased/upgraded	number	0	0
O.3.6	Number of projects to prevent crime	number	1	3
O.3.7	Number of projects to assist victims of crime	number	0	1
O.3.8	Number of victims of crimes assisted	number	0	0

## 2.1. Specific objective 3. Preventing and combating crime

### 2.1.2. Indicators

Reference: point (e) of Article 22(4) CPR

Table 2: Result indicators

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Baseline	Measurement unit for baseline	Reference year(s)	Target (2029)	Measurement unit for target	Source of data	Comments
R.3.9	Number of initiatives developed / expanded to prevent radicalisation	number	0	number	2021	3	number	Expert feedback from potential beneficiaries (notably NICC, Department of Justice).	Department of Justice: 3 planned training initiatives.
R.3.10	Number of initiatives developed / expanded to protect / support witnesses and whistle- blowers	number	0	number	2021	0	number	Not applicable	No actions planned.
R.3.11	Number of critical infrastructure/public spaces with new/adapted facilities protecting against security related risks	number	0	number	2021	1	number	Expert feedback from potential beneficiaries (notably BE Home Affairs ICT department).	Brussels capital area as critical infrastructure/pu blic space
R.3.12	Number of participants who consider the training useful for their work	number	0	share	2021	998	number	Expert feedback from potential beneficiaries (Department of Justice).	After consulting with potential beneficiaries who might conduct these training activities: 75 % usefullness rating = realistic estimate. Calculation method: 75% of milestone / 2029 of data estimates under O 3.1

ID	Indicator	Measurement unit	Baseline	Measurement unit for baseline	Reference year(s)	Target (2029)	Measurement unit for target	Source of data	Comments
R.3.13	Number of participants who report three months after leaving the training that they are using the skills and competences acquired during the training	number	0	share	2021	998	number	Currently there is no data available on this.	After consulting with potential beneficiaries who might conduct these training activities: 75 % usefullness rating = realistic estimate. Calculation method: 75% of milestone / 2029 of data estimates under O 3.1

## 2.1. Specific objective 3. Preventing and combating crime

## 2.1.3. Indicative breakdown of the programme resources (EU) by type of intervention

Reference: Article 22(5) CPR; and Article 16(12) AMIF Regulation, Article 13(12) ISF Regulation or Article 13(18) BMVI Regulation

Table 3: Indicative breakdown

Type of intervention	Code	Indicative amount (Euro)
Type of action	001.ICT systems, interoperability, data quality (excluding equipment)	739,431.12
Type of action	002.Networks, centres of excellence, cooperation structures, joint actions and operations	554,573.34
Type of action	003. Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) or other joint operations	0.00
Type of action	004.Secondment or deployment of experts	0.00
Type of action	005.Training	179,312.05
Type of action	006.Exchange of best practices, workshops, conferences, events, awareness-raising campaigns, communication activities	0.00
Type of action	007.Studies, pilot projects, risk assessments	443,658.68
Type of action	008.Equipment	177,463.47
Type of action	009.Means of transport	0.00
Type of action	010.Buildings, facilities	0.00
Type of action	011.Deployment or other follow-up of research projects	0.00

2.2. Technical assistance: TA.36(5). Technical assistance - flat rate (Art. 36(5) CPR)

Reference: point (f) of Article 22(3), Article 36(5), Article 37, and Article 95 CPR

#### 2.2.1. Description

The technical assistance (TA) of the three HOME funds AMIF, ISF and BMVI will be combined. The TA will mainly be used to cover the staff costs and related expenses of the Managing Authority (MA), the Intermediate Bodies (IB's) and the Audit Authority (AA).

BE currently envisages that <u>at least</u> 17 FTE will be paid by the TA of AMIF, ISF and BMVI combined. In line with article 44 of the CPR, the required evaluations will also be funded with the help of the TA. In addition, the TA will also be used for the further development and maintenance of the IT-system ('AMBIS') that is currently being developed by the Managing Authority under the 14-20 funding cycle. In line with article 69§8 of the CPR, the AMBIS IT-system will allow for all exchanges of information between beneficiaries and the programme authorities to be carried out by means of (an) electronic data exchange system in accordance with Annex XIV of the CPR.

Regarding communication and publicity, Belgium will fully support the initiatives created by the EU-inform network and will fulfill all its legal obligations. Within the MA, 1 FTE will be responsible to coordinate these obligations and activities. BE also foresees some budget for capacity building but the exact use of this still remains to be decided.

## 2.2. Technical assistance TA.36(5). Technical assistance - flat rate (Art. 36(5) CPR)

## 2.2.2. Indicative breakdown of technical assistance pursuant to Article 37 CPR

Table 4: Indicative breakdown

Type of intervention	Code	Indicative amount (Euro)
Intervention field	034.Information and communication	43,422.90
Intervention field	035.Preparation, implementation, monitoring and control	1,563,224.30
Intervention field	036.Evaluation and studies, data collection	86,845.78
Intervention field	037.Capacity building	43,422.90

3. Financing plan

Reference: point (g) Article 22(3) CPR

3.1. Financial appropriations by year

Table 5: Financial appropriations per year

Allocation type	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total
Initial allocation		4,227,842.00	6,327,907.00	6,174,786.00	5,322,527.00	4,527,441.00	4,105,011.00	30,685,514.00
Mid-term review								
Thematic facility WPI								
Thematic facility WPII								
Thematic facility WPIII								
Transfer (in)								
Transfer (out)								
Total		4,227,842.00	6,327,907.00	6,174,786.00	5,322,527.00	4,527,441.00	4,105,011.00	30,685,514.00

#### 3.2. Total financial allocations

## Table 6: Total financial allocations by fund and national contribution

Specific objective (SO)	Type of action	Basis for calculation Union support (total	Union contribution	National contribution	Indicative breakd		Total (e)=(a)+(b)	Co-financing rate
		or public)	(a)	(b)=(c)+(d)	Public (c)	Private (d)		(f)=(a)/(e)
Exchange of information	Regular actions	Total	13,348,819.67	4,449,606.39	4,449,606.39	0.00	17,798,426.06	75.0000007023%
Exchange of information	Annex IV actions	Total	7,985,856.16	1,064,780.82	1,064,780.82	0.00	9,050,636.98	88.2352941306%
Exchange of information	Operating support	Total	3,845,041.85	0.00	0.00	0.00	3,845,041.85	100.0000000000%
Total Exchange of information			25,179,717.68	5,514,387.21	5,514,387.21	0.00	30,694,104.89	82.0343768624%
Cross-border cooperation	Regular actions	Total	1,674,441.78	558,147.26	558,147.26	0.00	2,232,589.04	75.0000000000%
Cross-border cooperation	Annex IV actions	Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Cross-border cooperation	Operating support	Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Total Cross-border cooperation			1,674,441.78	558,147.26	558,147.26	0.00	2,232,589.04	75.0000000000%
Preventing and combating crime	Regular actions	Total	2,094,438.66	698,146.22	698,146.22	0.00	2,792,584.88	75.0000000000%
Preventing and combating crime	Annex IV actions	Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Preventing and combating crime	Operating support	Total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
Total Preventing and combating crime			2,094,438.66	698,146.22	698,146.22	0.00	2,792,584.88	75.0000000000%
Technical assistance - flat rate (Art. 36(5) CPR)			1,736,915.88	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,736,915.88	100.0000000000%
Grand total			30,685,514.00	6,770,680.69	6,770,680.69	0.00	37,456,194.69	81.9237358572%

#### 3.3. Transfers

Table 7: Transfers between shared management funds  $^{\rm 1}$ 

Transforming found		Receiving fund						
Transferring fund	AMIF	BMVI	ERDF	ESF+	CF	EMFAF	Total	
ISF								

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Cumulative amounts for all transfers during programming period.

Table 8: Transfers to instruments under direct or indirect management<sup>1</sup>

Instrument I ransfer Amount
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<sup>1</sup>Cumulative amounts for all transfers during programming period.

## 4. Enabling conditions

Reference: point (i) of Article 22(3) CPR

Table 9: Horizontal enabling conditions

Enabling condition	Fulfilment of enabling condition	Criteria	Fulfilment of criteria	Reference to relevant documents	Justification
1. Effective monitoring mechanisms of the public procurement market	Yes	Monitoring mechanisms are in place that cover all public contracts and their procurement under the Funds in line with Union procurement legislation. That requirement includes:  1. Arrangements to ensure compilation of effective and reliable data on public procurement procedures above the Union thresholds in accordance with reporting obligations under Articles 83 and 84 of Directive 2014/24/EU and Articles 99 and 100 of Directive 2014/25/EU.	Yes	<ol> <li>Publicprocurement.be</li> <li>Lois         <ol> <li>Passation et attribution : Loi du 17 juin 2016 relative aux marchés publics;</li> <li>Attribution d'un marché public : Loi du 17 juin 2013 relative à la motivation, à l'information et aux voies de recours en matière de marchés publics, de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services et de concessions.</li> </ol> </li> <li>Arrêtés royaux         <ol> <li>Arrêté royal du 18 avril 2017 relatif à la passation des marchés publics dans les secteurs classiques;</li> <li>Arrêté royal du 14 janvier 2013 établissant les règles générales d'exécution des marchés publics.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	Tous les bénéficiaires sont soumis au respect de la législation sur les marchés publics.  Si le montant du marché public > seuil de l'UE, seront notamment nécessaires: nom du contractant, numéro TVA ou d'identification financière, identification des bénéficiaires effectifs des contractants, date/nom/référence du contrat, etc. Si subventions en cascade : nom de l'entité concernée, numéro TVA ou d'identification fiscale et informations sur les accords entre l'entité et le bénéficiaire (date et montant de la convention & références).
		2. Arrangements to ensure the data cover at least the following elements:  a. Quality and intensity of competition: names of winning bidder, number of initial bidders and contractual value;  b. Information on final price after completion and on participation of SMEs as direct bidders, where national systems provide such information.	Yes	<ol> <li>Art. 4 de la loi du 17 juin 2013 relative à la motivation à l'information et aux voies de recours en matière de marchés publics et de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services.</li> <li>Décision motivée d'attribution.</li> <li>Charte «Accès des PME aux</li> </ol>	1. La loi du 17 juin 2013 prévoit, à l'article 4, al. 1, 8° que l'autorité adjudicatrice doit notamment rédiger une décision motivée lorsqu'elle attribue un marché (soumis à publicité EU), quelle que soit la procédure.  2. Reprend notamment le nom du soumissionnaire remportant le marché, le nombre de soumissionnaires initial et la

Enabling condition	Fulfilment of enabling condition	Criteria	Fulfilment of criteria	Reference to relevant documents	Justification
				marchés public», éditée par le SPF Économie, PME, Classes moyennes et Energie en 2018	valeur du marché attribué.  3.
				4. Règlement (UE) 2021/1060 du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 24 juin 2021.	Propose 13 principes afin d'accroître l'accès des PME aux marchés publics. Le public cible de la charte se compose en premier lieu des pouvoirs adjudicateurs fédéraux.
					4.
					Porte des dispositions communes relatives au Fonds européen de développement régional, au Fonds social européen plus, au Fonds de cohésion et au Fonds européen pour les affaires maritimes et la pêche, et établissant les règles financières applicables à ces Fonds et au Fonds «Asile et migration», au Fonds pour la sécurité intérieure et à l'instrument relatif à la gestion des frontières et aux visas.
		3. Arrangements to ensure monitoring and analysis of the data by the competent national authorities in accordance with article 83 (2) of directive 2014/24/EU and article 99 (2) of directive 2014/25/EU.	Yes	Acteurs du contrôle : SPF Intérieur (Autorité de gestion), Inspection des Finances, le Corps Interfédéral de l'Inspection des Finances (Autorité d'audit), la Cour des comptes de Belgique, la Cour des comptes européenne, la Commission européenne  Voies de recours : Médiateur, Conseil d'État, Cours et Tribunaux	Publicprocurement.be est à disposition de tout adjudicateur belge et permet d'effectuer toutes les procédures et transactions liées à un marché public de manière électronique. Les fonctionnaires et les entreprises peuvent trouver plusieurs informations (des manuels, des exemples de documents types, des points de contact) concernant les différents aspects des marchés publics depuis la législation jusqu'au traitement des marchés via les moyens électroniques.

Enabling condition	Fulfilment of enabling condition	Criteria	Fulfilment of criteria	Reference to relevant documents	Justification
				<ul> <li>3. Publicprocurement.be</li> <li>4. Loi du 17 juin 2013 relative à la motivation, à l'information et aux voies de</li> </ul>	
				recours en matière de marchés publics et de certains marchés de travaux, de fournitures et de services (art. 9/1 §2)	
		4. Arrangements to make the results of the analysis available to the public in accordance with article 83 (3) of directive 2014/24/EU and article 99 (3) directive 2014/25/EU.	Yes	L'Arrêté royal du 15 avril 2018 désigne le point de référence en vue de collaborer avec la Commission européenne en matière de marchés publics et de contrats de concession.	L'Arrête royal du 15 avril 2018 désigne la chancellerie SPF du Premier ministre comme point de contact au sens de l'article 83, paragraphe 5, de la directive 2014/24/UE. Cette entité coordonne la préparation du rapport de surveillance. Ce rapport de contrôle est publié sur leur site
				Un deuxième rapport de contrôle de la Belgique concernant les marchés publics et les concessions est également disponible : https://www.publicprocurement.be/fr/documents/rapport-de-controle-2021	Internet: https://www.publicprocurement.be/fr/docu ments/rapport-de-controle-concernant-les- marches-publics-et-les-concessions- belgique-2018
		5. Arrangements to ensure that all information pointing to suspected bidrigging situations is communicated to the competent national bodies in accordance with Article 83(2) of Directive 2014/24/EU and Article 99(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU.	Yes	L'article 36, §5 de l'arrêté royal du 18 avril 2017 relatif à la passation des marchés publics dans les secteurs classiques.  L'Autorité belge de la Concurrence met à disposition des acheteurs un guide sur la collusion dans les marchés publics:	L'article 36, §5 de l'arrêté royal du 18 avril 2017 relatif à la passation des marchés publics dans les secteurs classiques stipule que les offres interdites en raison de prix anormaux doivent être signalées à l'Autorité belge de la Concurrence : https://www.abc-bma.be/fr/propos-de-nous
				https://www.abc- bma.be/sites/default/files/content/downloa d/files/20170131_marches_publics.pdf	Il existe également la possibilité de se référer à ARACHNE, l'outil de notation des risques mis au point par la Commission européenne.

Enabling condition	Fulfilment of enabling condition	Criteria	Fulfilment of criteria	Reference to relevant documents	Justification
				Deuxième rapport de contrôle (2021) pour la Belgique concernant les marchés publics et les concessions. Informations pour les années 2018, 2019 et 2020: https://www.publicprocurement.be/nl/documenten/toezichtrapport-2021	
3. Effective application and implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights	Yes	Effective mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ('the Charter') which include:  1. Arrangements to ensure compliance of the programmes supported by the Funds and their implementation with the relevant provisions of the Charter.	Yes	Appels à projets et mise en œuvre des projets  Direction IV Droits fondamentaux du SPF Justice  FRA: « European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights » (https://e-learning.fra.europa.eu/; https://e-learning.fra.europa.eu/course/index.php?ca tegoryid=6)  Check list CE 2016/C269/01, annexe III  UNIA: soutien et formations pour les personnes qui veulent mener une politique de diversité (https://www.unia.be/fr/sensibilisation-et-prevention)  Webpagina EU-Charter: https://ec.europa.eu/info/aid-development-cooperation-fundamental-rights/your-rights-eu/eu-cha	Sensibilisation lors des appels à projets.  Engagement des bénéficiaires par rapport à la Charte dans la fiche de projet, et engagement rappelé dans l'arrêté de subvention.  Aux différentes étapes du projet, l'AG et ses autorités déléguées pour l'AMIF (ESF Vlaanderen et Agence FSE) veillent le respect de la charte.  L'autorité de gestion désigne en son sein un expert des Droits Fondamentaux. Cette personne est l'interlocuteur privilégié en cas de signalement de plainte ou de doute quant au respect de la Charte des droits fondamentaux. Elle travaille, le cas échéant, en collaboration avec ses partenaires (UNIA, Direction IV Droits fondamentaux du SPF Justice).  Pour disposer de l'expertise nécessaire pour assurer le respect de la Charte:  - L'expert suit une formation sur la Charte auprès de la FRA, renouvellée tous les deux ans (step-by-step Charter e-guidance, des exemples concrets montrant le champ d'application de la Charte, études de cas);  - L'expert se réfère à la checklist de la CE;  - L'expert se fait épauler par ses partenaires (UNIA, Direction IV Droits

Enabling condition	Fulfilment of enabling condition	Criteria	Fulfilment of criteria	Reference to relevant documents	Justification
					fondamentaux du SPF Justice)
		2. Reporting arrangements to the monitoring committee regarding cases of non-compliance of operations supported by the Funds with the Charter and complaints regarding the Charter submitted in accordance with the arrangements made pursuant to Article 69(7).	Yes	Comité de Suivi et son règlement d'ordre intérieur: Si des cas de non-conformité avec la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne sont identifiés, ils seront rapportés au comité de suivi ; les plaintes reçues et les suites qui leur ont été données seront également rapportées au comité de suivi. Règlement intérieur du comité de suivi : un point sera ajouté concernant la compatibilité des actions avec la Charte des droits fondamentaux.	En cas de doutes ou de constat de non- respect de la Charte par un des bénéficiaires, ou si elle est confrontée à une plainte, l'expert des Droits Fondamentaux prend contact avec avec un de ses partenaires (UNIA, Direction IV Droits fondamentaux du SPF Justice). Il peut ainsi être conseillé quant aux démarches à entreprendre.  Les cas de non-conformité seront signalés au Comité de Suivi.  Traitement des plaintes concernant spécifiquement l'application de la Charte de l'Union européenne : les plaintes seront transmises aux organismes compétents, avec une demande de suivi à l'autorité de gestion, le cas échéant.  Un point est fait au minimum 1 fois par an au Comité de Suivi (actions concernant la Charte, résumé des plaintes et recours, et des cas de non-conformité constaté). Si nécessaire, un partenaire (UNIA, Direction IV Droits fondamentaux du SPF Justice) est invité au Comité de Suivi pour expliquer le cas. De la sorte, le Comité de suivi peut prendre une décision informée, le cas échéant.  Inclusion d'une phrase dans le règlement intérieur du Comité de Suivi obligeant l'AG à l'informer des cas de non- conformité de la Charte ou des plaintes en lien avec celle-ci.
					lien avec celle-ci.

Enabling condition	Fulfilment of enabling condition	Criteria	Fulfilment of criteria	Reference to relevant documents	Justification
4. Implementation and application of the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (UNCRPD) in accordance with Council Decision 2010/48/EC	Yes	A national framework to ensure implementation of the UNCRPD is in place that includes:  1. Objectives with measurable goals, data collection and monitoring mechanisms.	Yes	Objectifs et mécanismes de suivi  - UNIA : Service public indépendant propose un soutien et des formations pour les personnes qui veulent mener une politique de diversité (https://www.unia.be/fr/sensibilisation-et-prevention)  - Article 22 ter de la Constitution belge  - La CNUDPH prescrit la désignation d'une instance indépendante pour le suivi de la Convention et d'un mécanisme de coordination au sein de l'administration  - Plan d'action fédéral Handicap 2021-2024 : https://socialsecurity.belgium.be/fr/handist reaming	L'AG veille au respect de la CNUDPH par les bénéficiaires durant toute la durée de leur projet.  En collaboration avec UNIA , l'autorité de gestion prépare une checklist comprenant les points importants à contrôler afin d'assurer le respect de la CNUDPH par les bénéficiaires.  En collaboration avec UNIA, l'autorité de gestion décide de la fréquence et des modalités selon lesquelles les bénéficiaires doivent être contrôlé sur le respect de la CNUDPH.  Plan national "Handistreaming" compte 145 mesures. Un rapport à mi-terme (fin '22) présentera les avancées et contiendra des mesures visant à réaliser la Stratégie interfédérale handicap ('21-30). L'AG évalue si, oui ou non, ces mesures sont réalisées par les bénéficiaires.  Transmission des données collectées au SPF sécurité sociale.  SPF sécurité sociale DG Soutien et Coordination (BESOC) est point de contact et de coordination.  Rapport étatique belge concernant la mise en œuvre de la CNUDPH (2011)  Observations finales du rapport périodique de la Belgique (2014)  Rapport alternatif "Belgian Disability Forum (BDF) (2014)  Evaluation à mi-parcours de la CNUDPH

Enabling condition	Fulfilment of enabling condition	Criteria	Fulfilment of criteria	Reference to relevant documents	Justification
					par le BDF (2017)
		2. Arrangements to ensure that accessibility policy, legislation and standards are properly reflected in the	Yes	Programmes opérationnels	Engagement des bénéficiaires par rapport à la CNUDPH dans fiche de projet, rappelé dans arrêté de subvention.
		preparation and implementation of the programmes.		Appels à projets et mise en œuvre des projets	Dans la préparation et la mise en œuvre des programmes, l'AG et ses autorités déléguées (ESF Vlaanderen et Agence FSE) vérifient le respect de la charte :
					- Pour disposer de l'expertise nécessaire, elles sont formées par UNIA;
					- Les cas de non-conformité sont signalés au Comité de suivi;
					- Les plaintes sur application de la CNUDPH sont transmises aux organismes compétents, avec une demande de suivi à l'AG, le cas échéant.
					Un point est fait au minimun 1 fois par an au Comité de Suivi (actions concernant la CNUDPH, résumé des plaintes et recours, et des cas de non-conformité constatés). Si nécessaire, UNIA est invité au Comité de Suivi pour expliquer le cas. Le Comité de suivi peut alors prendre une décision informée, le cas échéant.
					L'AG désigne dans son équipe une personne de référence concernant la diversité et l'égalité des chances. Cette personne est l'interlocuteur privilégié de l'AG et de ses autorités déléguées pour l'AMIF en cas de signalement de plainte ou de doute quant au respect de la CNUDPH. Cette personne, le cas échéant, travaille avec UNIA.
		3. Reporting arrangements to the	Yes	Le comité de suivi et son règlement	Un point sera fait au minimum 1 fois par

Enabling condition	Fulfilment of enabling condition	Criteria	Fulfilment of criteria	Reference to relevant documents	Justification
		monitoring committee regarding cases of non-compliance of operations supported by the Funds with the UNCRPD and complaints regarding the UNCRPD submitted in accordance with the arrangements made pursuant to Article 69(7).		d'ordre intérieur	an au Comité de suivi (actions concernant la CNUDPH, résumé des plaintes et recours, et des cas de non-conformité constaté). Si nécessaire UNIA est invité au Comité de Suivi pour expliquer le cas.  Le Comité de Suivi peut ainsi prendre une décision informée, le cas échéant.  Inclusion d'une phrase dans le règlement intérieur du Comité de Suivi obligeant l'AG à l'informer des cas de nonconformité ou des plaintes liées à CNUDPH.

### 5. Programme authorities

Reference: point (k) of Article 22(3) and Articles 71 and 84 CPR

Table 10: Programme authorities

Programme Authority	Name of the institution	Contact name	Position	Email
Managing authority	Federal Public Service Home Affairs - European Funds Unit	Stijn Lenjou	Head of Unit	Stijn.Lenjou@ibz.be
Audit authority	Interfederal Corps of the Inspectorate of Finance		Head of the Federal Audit Cell of the Inspectorate of Finance for the European Funds	BJS.Baumann@inspfin.fed.be
Body which receives payments from the Commission	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	amif.isf@ibz.eu

Reference: point (h) of Article 22(3) CPR

The Managing Authority launched a wide consultation process in January 2020, aimed at collecting the necessary input for the preparation of the AMIF, ISF & BMVI draft National Programmes for the period 2021-2027. This process continued throughout 2020 and 2021, up until the point of submission of the draft programmes. As a starting point, a questionnaire was sent out for each draft National Programme to relevant administrations and current beneficiaries, in order to inquire about the experiences of beneficiaries during the past programming period, the perceived challenges in terms of AMIF/ISF/BMVI, the needs in terms of 'operating support' and 'emergency assistance', possible interest in participating in joint 'Specific Actions', operational objectives of the relevant AMIF/ISF/BMVI funds to be financed, and an indicative list of actions/projects. Given the nature of potential actions under the ISF and the fact that funds are typically attributed via 'direct award procedure', consulted entities were mainly limited to socalled 'institutional players' whose competences fall within the scope of the ISF. These include the Belgian Federal Police, the General Directorate Security & Prevention of the Ministry of Interior, the National Crisis Centre, the Staff Directorate ICT of the Ministry of Interior, the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), the Federal Services of the Governors, the Belgian Federal Migration Centre (MYRIA), the National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology (NICC), and the Directorate-General for Penitentiary Institutions (DGEPI) within the Ministry of Justice. Based on the received inputs, a first draft National Programme was drawn up by the Managing Authority for each of the concerned funds. After each cycle of revision and updating/integrating comments, including those from European Commission experts, a revised version of the draft National Programme was circulated.

Moreover, the preparation and implementation of the National Programmes has been done under the auspices of the **existing 'Steering Group'**, comprising representatives of the relevant political cabinets (Interior Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Asylum & Migration, Social Integration, Budget (as an observer),...), the Managing Authority and relevant administrations.

While the majority of the above-mentioned partners are primarily (entities belonging to) federal public administrations, this can be explained due to the fact that within the Belgian institutional context, the most important so-called 'ISF competences' such as security and justice, are typically managed on the federal level. Hence, actors on the regional level play a less prominent role in this regard, unlike in the AMIF Fund for example.

With regard to the **involvement of actors on the local level**, it is worth highlighting the role of the Belgian Integrated Police. The **Belgian Integrated Police** is structured on two levels, with the **Federal Police** on the one hand and the **185 local police zones** on the other hand. Although both levels are autonomous, they cooperate to perform an integrated police function. The Federal Police also ensures the necessary specialized support to local police entities. Hence, in this respect, there is a continuous feedback loop present within the Belgian Integrated Police which ensures that the policy priorities of local level entities are taken up and translated into general policy priorities.

In addition, it is worth highlighting that **some of the above-mentioned partners occupy a somewhat particular position in the institutional landscape**. For example, **Myria** – the Belgian Federal Migration Centre – is an **independent public body** which analyses migration, defends the rights of foreigners and combats human smuggling and trafficking. Since 2008, it has been the contact point in Belgium for the European Migration Network (EMN). Myria also works to ensure that the basic rights of foreigners are respected, through field observations (particularly within the detention or so-called 'closed' centres) and by carefully following the complex legislation that regulates this issue. It also provides first line support to persons who wish to receive information on their fundamental rights or residency status. In addition, since 2014, Myria has been appointed as the independent National Rapporteur on Human Trafficking, alongside the Interdepartmental Coordination Unit, which reports on behalf of the Belgian State. The board of directors regularly votes to file civil charges on human trafficking and smuggling cases. This allows Myria to share its expertise with the judiciary and other stakeholders and to acquire a thorough knowledge on the subject. Every year Myria draws up an independent public evaluation report describing the developments and results in the fight against international human trafficking. It also coordinates three

specialized reception centres for victims of human trafficking.

Another example is the **National Institute of Criminalistics and Criminology (NICC)**, a federal scientific institute which conducts **independent investigations** at the request of the judicial authorities within its role as the scientific branch of the Ministry of Justice. In addition to providing forensic expert opinions, the NICC also conducts scientific research and plays an active role on the international level, including within the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) and with a variety of external partners within scientific research programmes such as Framework 7 and ISEC. During the previous programming cycle (2014-2020), the NICC has also been an active participant in the implementation of the ISF programme (for example through implementing the 'BE PRUM ADN' project). This active involvement will continue in the upcoming programming cycle (2021-2027).

For the new programming period 2021-2027, BE plans to build on its existing – and functioning – operating structures. The current 'Steering Group' will be transformed in a 'Monitoring **Committee**', which will be responsible for monitoring the progress in the implementation of the different National Programmes, as well as for the approval of the annual (and final) performance reports for the AMIF, ISF and BMVI Funds. In line with article 40 of the CPR, the Monitoring Committee will also examine any issues that might affect the performance of the programme and the measures taken to address those issues. Hence, the partners who play the largest role in the implementation of the programmes are indirectly represented via the representatives of their respective political cabinets. In addition and in line with article 39\\$3 of the CPR, relevant decentralised administrations may also participate in the work of the Monitoring Committee. Beyond the work of the Monitoring Committee and specifically when it comes to the involvement of economic and social partners, it is important to highlight BE's long tradition of institutionalized social dialogue on a multitude of levels. For example, on the federal (national) level, both the National Labour Council ('Nationale Arbeidsraad' (NAR) / 'Conseil National de Travail' (CNT)) and the Central Council for the Economy ('Centrale Raad voor het Bedrijfsleven / Conseil Central de l'Economie) have an important role to play. Both bodies consist of delegates of the employers and workers organizations who are considered representative for the Belgian economic and social world. They act in an advisory capacity, either on their own initiative or on the request of members of the Belgian federal government or Parliament.

The same goes true with regard to the involvement of relevant bodies representing fundamental rights as well as equality and inclusion, where it is for example worth mentioning the role of 'Unia'. Unia is an independent public institution that fights discrimination and promotes equal opportunities. Its independence and engagement in favor of human rights is recognized by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. As an institution, it has interfederal competence, which means that, in BE, it is active at the federal level as well as the level of the regions and communities. Unia also mounts campaigns for equal opportunities and against discrimination, formulates recommendations for government authorities and generates tools, publications and statistics. Specifically with regard to ensuring the compliance of the Home Affairs programmes and their implementation with the relevant provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Managing Authority foresees an important supporting role by 'Unia'. Both in terms of ensuring the necessary expertise as well as through providing relevant advice in case of doubts, a finding of non-compliance with the Charter, or a specific complaint, 'Unia' is considered as a key partner. In addition, the Managing Authority anticipates the possibility for 'Unia' or another partner in the field of human rights (f. ex. Directorate IV on Fundamental Rights of the Federal Public Service Justice) to be invited to meetings of the Monitoring Committee, i.a. in order to provide explanations on specific cases for example. Lastly, the Managing Authority will also prepare a checklist in cooperation with 'Unia' containing the most important verification elements with regard to the implementation and application of the United Nations Convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (UNCRPD). More details on the exact role of 'Unia' and its participation in the Monitoring Committee can be found in the section on 'enabling conditions'.

In line with the Monitoring Committee's (future) rules of procedure, **BE will foresee the possibility to invite the above-mentioned partners and/or others, including representatives of the local / regional authorities**, where appropriate, to meetings of the Monitoring Committee according to the issues on the agenda or the progress stage of the programme in line with Article 39 (1) of the CPR. In addition, when relevant, **information sessions** will be organised by the Managing Authority involving both institutional

players and other partners in line with Article 8 of the CPR, with the aim to discuss progress in programme implementation.

To conclude, BE will comply with the requirements of article 44 of the CPR by entrusting (an) **evaluation(s)** of the AMIF/ISF/BMVI programmes to internal/external experts who are **functionally independent**, and this both for the 'impact assessment evaluations' to be carried out by 30 June 2029 as well as for the 'criteria evaluations' (effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and Union added value, etc.). Building on the evaluation experiences of the ongoing programming period (2014-2020), this approach allows for a **wide and broad involvement of all types of stakeholders**, both within and beyond the administrations represented within the Monitoring Committee. The same logic applies for the ex-post evaluation report on the effects of actions under the ongoing national programmes (2014-2020), in line with article 57(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) No. 514/2014 (to be conducted by 31 December 2023). For the purpose of transparency, all evaluations will also be published on the website of the Managing Authority.

Reference: point (j) of Article 22(3) CPR

In terms of ensuring the necessary <u>communication and visibility with regard to ISF</u>, BE will primarily target (existing) project beneficiaries as a target audience. This is based on the fact that funding under ISF is (mainly) attributed to institutional players via "direct awards". Information sessions will be organized to provide information and support to beneficiaries on the conceptualisation of their project, its implementation and the reporting obligations associated with it. During these sessions, the beneficiaries will also be informed about their new communication obligations (such as the correct use of the EU emblem) in order to increase the visibility of their project and that of the European Union. Secondary objectives in terms of communication and visibility are informing the general public about the activities and results of the programme(s), and showing the positive impact and added value of EU financing.

In order to achieve this, BE will primarily **build on the existing measures and communication channels** which are currently in place. At the level of the Managing Authority, these include, first and foremost, the AMIF-ISF website (https://amif-isf.be/nl, available in Dutch and French), which will be updated in view of the new programming period 2021-2027. The **AMIF-ISF website** will therefore continue to be the main entry portal for any potential beneficiary who is looking for information and/or funding opportunities in the context of the BE National Programmes on ISF. A link to the relevant EU web-portal providing information about funding opportunities through the 'EU thematic facility', will also be added to the website.

The AMIF-ISF site will be integrated as soon as possible into the Belgian joint portal of the European Structural and Investment Funds (http://www.europeinbelgium.be/fr/), in accordance with Article 46 b) of the CPR.

In accordance with Article 48 of the CPR, Belgium has designated a **National Coordinator for visibility, transparency and communication activities related to the support of the funds**. In addition, the managing authority has appointed a **Communication Officer**. He/she is responsible for the communication of the ISF funds. He/she will be in regular contact with the National Coordinator and the other Belgian communication officers. He/she participates in the country team meetings, as well as the various activities set up by the INFORM platform.

Furthermore, the managing authority will participate in the **Kohesio project** (https://kohesio.eu/) led by the European Commission, from the moment when its scope is expanded to Belgium. The Kohesio project aims at creating a knowledge base of EU co-funded projects and beneficiaries. In this way, a greater public visibility of the projects carried out by the various beneficiaries will be ensured.

In terms of estimated budget, the **costs for communication will form an integral part of BE's technical assistance**, and will mainly consist – at the level of the Managing Authority – of personnel costs (salary 'Communication Officer') and maintenance costs for the website.

Lastly, in terms of **indicators and associated targets for communication activities**, BE aims to achieve the following results on the level of the programme:

- 100% of calls published on the public website;
- 100% of selected projects published on the public website;
- 100% of selected projects published on Kohesio;
- 2 participations to joint communication activities with other managing authorities.

8. Use of unit costs, lump sums, flat rates and financing not linked to costs

Reference: Articles 94 and 95 CPR

Intended use of Articles 94 and 95 CPR	Yes	No
From the adoption, the programme will make use of reimbursement of the Union contribution based on unit costs, lump sums and flat rates under the priority according to Article 94 CPR		$\boxtimes$
From the adoption, the programme will make use of reimbursement of the Union contribution based on financing not linked to costs according to Article 95 CPR		$\boxtimes$

### Appendix 1: Union contribution based on unit costs, lump sums and flat rates

### A. Summary of the main elements

	Estimated proportion of the total financial allocation	Type(s) of operation covered		Indicator triggering reimbursement (2)		- Unit of measurement for the	Type of SCO	Amount (in EUR) or
Specific objective	total financial allocation within the specific objective to which the SCO will be applied in %	Code(1)	Description	Code(2)	Description	indicator triggering reimbursement	(standard scale of unit costs, lump sums or flat rates)	percentage (in case of flat rates) of the SCO

<sup>(1)</sup> This refers to the code in Annex VI of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF Regulations

<sup>(2)</sup> This refers to the code of a common indicator, if applicable

Appendix 1: Union contribution based on unit costs, lump sums and flat rates

B. Details by type of operation

C. Calculation of the standard scale of unit costs, lump sums or flat rates
1. Source of data used to calculate the standard scale of unit costs, lump sums or flat rates (who produced, collected and recorded the data, where the data is stored, cut-off dates, validation, etc.)

2. Please specify why the proposed method and calculation based on Ar	ticle 94(2) CPR is relevant to the
type of operation.	

3. Please specify now the calculations were made, in particular including any assumptions made in terms
of quality or quantities. Where relevant, statistical evidence and benchmarks should be used and, if
requested, provided in a format that is usable by the Commission.

4. Please explain how you have ensured that only eligible expenditure was included in the calculation of
the standard scale of unit cost, lump sum or flat rate.
, 1

5. Assessment of the audit authority(ies) of the calculation methodology and amounts and the arrangements to ensure the verification, quality, collection and storage of data.

# Appendix 2: Union contribution based on financing not linked to costs

#### A. Summary of the main elements

The emount		Type(s) of	operation covered	Conditions to be fulfilled/results to	Indic	ators	Unit of measurement for the conditions to be	
Specific objective	The amount covered by the financing not linked to costs		Description	be achieved triggering reimbusresment by the Commission	Code(2)	Description	fulfilled/results to be achieved triggering reimbursement by the Commission	Envisaged type of reimbursement method used to reimburse the beneficiary(ies)

<sup>(1)</sup> Refers to the code in Annex VI of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF Regulations.

<sup>(2)</sup> Refers to the code of a common indicator, if applicable.

B. Details by type of operation

## DOCUMENTS

Document title	Document type	Document date	Local reference	Commission reference	Files	Sent date	Sent by
Programme snapshot 2021BE65ISPR001 1.3	Snapshot of data before send	29-Aug-2022		Ares(2022)5985048	Programme_snapshot_2021BE65ISPR001_1.3_en.pdf	29-Aug-2022	Laevens, Margareta